State violence inflicts obvious direct costs on its victims, but many of its significant consequences may be indirect. Building on the literature on agency problems in authoritarian regimes, we argue that coercion against bureaucrats motivates them to pursue over-zealous goals at the expense of wider social costs. We test this argument by studying how bureaucratic purges in China under Mao impacted the behavior of local bureaucrats during the Great Leap Forward, a campaign that caused over 30 million deaths from mass starvation. Exploiting variations in purge intensity across about 1,400 counties, we find the purge intimidated local bureaucrats into inflating agricultural production and extracting excessive amounts of grain from farmers, which resulted in significantly higher famine mortality. The results highlight the downstream perils of "accountability by violence" in autocratic regimes.

Existing literature shows that increasing political oversight of bureaucrats can improve the quality of government service delivery. Yet when the state is mainly concerned with maximizing revenue extraction from society, increasing bureaucratic oversight may result in social loss. I illustrate this argument with evidence from the Great Chinese Famine, drawing on panel data covering over 2,000 counties. I show that weather shocks, which increased central-local information asymmetry concerning local grain output, led to greater local autonomy in setting grain extraction quotas. During the famine, this autonomy allowed county officials to relax the execution of excessive grain extraction targets from above, which reduced the mortality cost of the perverse state mandates. This finding highlights the potential negative social impacts of bureaucratic control in authoritarian states.

Civilian victimization by armed groups is a prevalent byproduct of war, but does it have wider political consequences beyond the ongoing conflict? We argue that civilian victimization by a foreign military ingrains memories of victimization among the affected population, which facilitates state mobilization of domestic resources for armed conflicts with other states. To test this argument, we examine the impact of atrocities committed by the Japanese army against Chinese civilians during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). Drawing on over 3,300 geo-located cases of aerial bombings and civilian killings, we find that these atrocities by foreign forces facilitated the Chinese state's mobilization of civilians to participate in the later Korean War (1950-1953). In counties where civilians had been targeted with violence by the Japanese army, a higher number of people volunteered to enlist to fight in the Korean War.

What are the military consequences of redistribution during civil war? We argue that redistribution induces a trade-off between soldier recruitment and combat motivation. When redistribution benefits a narrow population of supporters at the expense of broader civilians, it increases battleground motivation but negatively affects soldier recruitment. We test this claim with data from the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949), when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) carried out radical land reform in occupied areas. We digitize a new dataset of 260,000 Communist soldiers to estimate how land reform affected the CCP's soldier recruitment and soldier death rates. Comparing these outcomes before and after land reform with a difference-in-differences design, we document a negative effect of land reform on the CCP's soldier recruitment. We also find that CCP soldiers enlisted after land reform died at higher rates. The findings shed new light on the consequences of wartime redistribution. 

The conventional wisdom says that representation pacifies politics by replacing bullets with ballots. But this argument overlooks the downstream political cost of representation for rulers: the institutionalized congregation enables the representatives to exercise their collective power, making the threat of a revolt more credible and raising the risk of revolution. Using the case of China at the end of the Qing dynasty, we show how territorial representation increased the corporate power of the elite and engendered the revolution. The counties with more powerful elites obtained better representation in the newly formed provincial assemblies in 1909, and later counties with more representation facilitated the fall of the imperial order during the 1911 Revolution. Representative institutions involve a trade-off between effective administration and the risk of political conflict, which may explain why the adoption of such institutions is not universal despite their purported benefits.

Selectorate theory suggests the size of ruling coalitions is consequential for autocratic leaders' survival, yet existing theory provides little account on what determines the selection of excluded individuals into an autocratic ruling coalition. We propose that economic endowment and abilities of collective action jointly determine the target of cooptation in autocracies. We test this argument by focusing on an exogenous expansion of elite cooptation triggered by war in nineteenth century China. Exploiting varying increases in admission quotas of the civil examination, an institution that selects candidates for officialdom among educated commoners, we test the effect of a foreign trade windfall on the quota increases. We find counties benefited from the rapid expansion of tea exportation received more civil exam quotas, thereby generating more co-opted elites. The effect of foreign trade was greater where abilities of local collective action were high. We further show that cooptation had a lasting impact: counties experienced higher quota increases not only generated more autocratic elites; they also produced more democratic representatives when the dictatorship collapsed.